Physical Address
304 North Cardinal St.
Dorchester Center, MA 02124
Physical Address
304 North Cardinal St.
Dorchester Center, MA 02124
In a significant collaboration display, the spymasters of the United States and Britain recently co-authored an opinion piece for Financial Times. Titled “Bill Burns and Richard Moore: Intelligence Partnership Helps the U.S. and U.K. Stay Ahead in an Uncertain World,” the piece underscores the joint efforts of both spymasters in navigating the current global uncertainty and emerging threats, particularly from Russia and global terror outfits like ISIS. It also highlights the difficulties of maintaining peace and stability in the midst of multiple wars.
In their joint effort, CIA Director William Burns and MI6 Chief Richard Moore must recognize the weakening of the Western security architecture and the rapid rise of China. And the reality of the international situation is graver than their piece expresses.
The intelligence chiefs deliver a sobering assessment of the mounting hardships facing the world today, particularly those compounded by rapid technological advancements. They argue that the international system is now more contested than ever, with unprecedented threats necessitating global cooperation and swift action. However, while they acknowledge the dangers that lie ahead, their call for a strengthened security architecture and partnership is open to scrutiny.
Simply strengthening the existing architecture may no longer be viable given recent failures: the breakdown of European security, growing instability in Asia, the US’s disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan and the current crisis in Bangladesh. Each event has contributed to a growing wave of anti-US sentiment across several regions.
Although a strong partnership between the US and UK may work on a bilateral level, their vision of it serving as a reliable counterweight to the shifting geopolitical landscape seems overly optimistic at best. For Burns and Moore, the idea of such a partnership standing firm in the face of current global upheavals remains a distant hope.
Europe’s security architecture has been deteriorating for years. The US has experienced mounting pressure to provide a sustainable defense against the looming threats from Russia and the possible resurgence of ISIS. Despite widespread anti-Russian rhetoric across Europe, the region’s security response has been lackluster. Many European nations have failed to adequately fund their militaries. Critical arms deals, such as the pledge to supply 155mm artillery shells to Ukraine, have seen delays. Meanwhile, the US has received criticism from NATO for its military assistance to Ukraine, further straining relations.
Russia’s escalating offensive along Europe’s frontlines highlights the disjointed coordination between Europe and the US on both security and strategic fronts. The notion of preemptively halting Russia’s invasion no longer holds weight, as the post-invasion reality has seen the transatlantic alliance weaken, leading to significant setbacks for Ukraine. Even with occasional Ukrainian victories, sustaining the fight against Russia without US support appears increasingly improbable.
As the US heads into an election this November, Europe faces added uncertainty. In his campaign rhetoric, former US President Donald Trump openly criticized Europe’s failure to meet defense spending commitments, declaring that Russia can “do whatever the hell they want” about countries that don’t pull their weight. His words underscore a glaring issue: Europe’s defense sector remains outdated and underfunded, lacking the modernization necessary to confront modern threats.
On the economic front, Europe is equally strained. Former Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi recently warned that the EU is at risk of “slow and agonising decline,” according to his scathing report. With Europe struggling to keep pace on both security and economic fronts and the US grappling with its own “American Decline,” the prospect of a strong transatlantic partnership to counter Russian aggression seems more like a political talking point than a realistic solution to bridging the deepening strategic gaps.
The abrupt and chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 left South Asia teetering on the edge of security and humanitarian crises. Although the assassination of al-Qaeda chief Ayman al Zawahiri in 2022 attempted to salvage some strategic credibility, it did little to mask the US’s broader challenge: its diminishing influence in the region. As China’s rise continues to reshape Asian dynamics, the US has struggled to maintain its foothold through both strategic and tactical efforts.
US-led initiatives like the Quad and the AUKUS military alliance, aimed at containing China’s growing power in the Indo-Pacific, have so far delivered underwhelming results. Australia’s maritime defense remains underfunded and underdeveloped, despite the country’s capital of Canberra being a critical frontline for AUKUS. Politically, the Quad has also struggled, with consensus-building proving elusive. Former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull added to the skepticism, pointing out that the US will not exacerbate its own submarine deficit by selling vessels to Australia — a decision Canberra residents have received poorly.
Even Europe’s stance on AUKUS has been fraught with tension. The submarine deal between the US and UK sparked fears that the transatlantic relationship could be undermined. These developments highlight a stark truth: Trust and transparency in defense alliances are far more difficult to build than they appear.
A recent report by the Lowy Institute titled, “Asia Power Snapshot: China and the United States in Southeast Asia,” paints an even grimmer picture. It concluded that the US has steadily lost influence to China in Southeast Asia over the past five years across key sectors, including diplomacy, culture, defense and economics. This soft decline, coupled with alleged backdoor politics and clandestine psychological maneuvers in countries like Bangladesh, underscores the depth of America’s waning influence in South Asia. Meanwhile, the UK grapples with its own politico-economic struggles, further complicating its role in transatlantic security and broader geopolitical challenges.
Burns and Moore have underscored the growing dangers posed by artificial intelligence in their analysis of evolving warfare tactics, particularly in the Russia–Ukraine conflict. They argue that AI has dramatically altered war-fighting techniques, with implications far beyond the current battlefields. These threats, however, are not confined to Ukraine; they are global in scope and demand collective action.
Similarly, terrorism — despite facing setbacks in recent years — has seen a quiet resurgence. The re-emergence of ISIS in Europe’s periphery, coupled with recent terror incidents in West Africa and even the Russian capital of Moscow, has forced the US to reconsider its position amid the deterioration of European security.
Both the CIA and MI6 chiefs have also pointed to sabotage operations conducted by Russia and China, taking a firm stance on countering such threats. Yet even intelligence operations face significant challenges. The US has suffered setbacks in China regarding its covert presence, while Russia’s GRU intelligence unit has orchestrated several subversive activities across Europe, such as cyberattacks against NATO and the EU. The GRU’s meddling has revealed cracks in the Western security structure.
Despite the tough rhetoric, the CIA and MI6 chiefs have publicly endorsed ideals such as “trust, openness, constructive challenge, and friendship.” They assert that these qualities will sustain the US–UK partnership well into the future, and that the relationship will continue to serve as a pillar of “global peace and security.”
However, the hard truth is that these characteristics are in constant tension. The fragility of this so-called special relationship is apparent, as it has delivered few lasting results in recent years. While such words make for polished diplomacy, both spymasters must now grapple with the uncomfortable fact: Real progress in strengthening their partnership has been slow and insufficient. It remains to be seen if their renewed efforts can finally solidify the bond that has been repeatedly tested by mounting global pressures.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.